Issue paper: PICT210 Issue: The South China Sea region has seen conflict regarding the construction of islands and military bases by the PRC. As well as this, PRC forces are expanding outwards throughout various islands through the South China Sea, claiming islands in extremely close proximity to neighbouring countries. Key findings: The PRC’s intentions are set on expansion along the entirety of the nine-dash line. The PRC are constructing military bases on islands in this region, and their economic might could lead to the intimidation of smaller countries in the region. This could be detrimental to strategic military positioning and sea lines of communication (SLOCs) should this region ever turn hostile, as well as cause conflict with competing countries claiming sovereignty over waters in the region. Conflict must be resolved peacefully and tensions regarding sovereignty in the area must be eased, as well as the de-escalation of military build-up of islands and ports surrounding the South China Sea. Discussion: This issue revolves around the seemingly unlawful expansion of Chinese territorial waters into close proximity of other countries and claiming islands in this vicinity. If this issue escalates it could be detrimental to trade and regional security, turning the area hostile. This event could lead to the deterioration of US influence in Southeast Asia and cement China’s position as the leading superpower in the Indo-Pacific region. This conflict could potentially lead to the overpowering of smaller countries and even further expansion past the nine-dash line. Opposing views say that Australia is in no danger from tensions in the South China Sea as we rely on each other economically; both countries stand to lose too much in conflict. However, if the region turns hostile the major SLOCs will be disrupted and Australia’s trade will be greatly affected. As well as this, allowing the PRC to have free reign over the South China Sea without US interference will negatively affect the region. Future Projection In the near future the PRC will continue their island-building processes throughout the South China Sea, and create a variety of military bases along their perceived territory in order to defend it. They will be unwilling to give up any of their current standing under current policy, and will not hesitate to manipulate smaller countries and push out US influence in the area. Recommendations Some recommendations include the continued tracking of PRC forces and improved relations with surrounding nations, as this will assist in gaining information and conducting surveillance in the future. Additionally, improved relations with surrounding nations in the region will greatly improve intelligence sharing, potentially invoking the Five Power Defence Arrangements as a major catalyst for intelligence sharing and ensuring that vulnerable regions are not exposed to manipulation and intimidation. Intelligence estimate: South China Sea Mission: To analyse the PRC’s available COAs in the South China Sea region, evaluate intentions and identify likely and dangerous COA. Situation and Considerations: The operational environment centres on islands in the South China Sea which are under dispute of ownership by China, Vietnam, Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia and Taiwan. This region is mainly under the occupation of the PRC’s forces, both military and civilian, however also is occupied by some forces of the other claimants. Analysis: Environment The PRC currently occupy islands within the area of the Spratly Islands, with particular focus on the island-building at Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef and Mischief Reef (O’Rourke, 2019). These reefs have undergone construction to create new islands, a process referred to as ‘salami slicing’ (O’Rourke, 2019), as well as being turned into naval bases with increasing amounts of aircraft and technology designed to deter other patrols or attacks. Additionally, the nine-dash line being followed invades or comes drastically close to other nations’ borders, as seen on the map provided (RSIS, 2012),which has also been causing conflict. This region is also home to several nations’ SLOCs (Department of Defence , 2016), which if interrupted could allow the PRC to control all trade in the region. Adversary The intent and objectives of the PRC appear to revolve around the expansion of the nine-dash line as well as the construction of bases along this region. The PRC has made it clear that one of their main national objectives is to claim the region within the nine-dash line, evident through the Chinese White Paper characterizing the region as theirs to defend (The State Council, 2015). Along with this, the named areas of interest (NAI) through the Spratly Islands have been undergoing construction to accommodate aircraft, naval militia vessels and civilian facilities. This is part of an ongoing ‘One China’ policy, pushed forward by Xi Jinping and the military to recover China’s historic territory (Shi, 2015), despite the modern claimants to these areas (The State Council, 2015). In this desperation to reclaim this territory, it appears that the PRC is willing to sacrifice a part of their reputation in order to achieve this, without conceding one inch of their historical territory (The State Council, 2015), (O’Rourke, 2019). Some vulnerabilities of the PRC exposed in this situation are centred on the environment of the region. While the Malacca Strait may potentially be a key reason to why the PRC are adamant in their expansion towards this region, it could also be used against them, due to the large portion of trade flowing through that region and it being the main route of their SLOCs (Department of Defence , 2016). This vulnerability is expanded through the geographic location of the PRC in relations to the Malacca Strait, as the strait is surrounded by other countries in which China has little influence. As well as this, a key COG that could be exploited is the reliance on economic and military might over the other smaller claimants, especially Brunei and the Philippines, due to the PRC’s superior economic might on defence spending $151bn in 2017 (Defence Intelligence Organisation, 2018). The PRC relies on having this influence over the smaller nations, and if these nations had strong support behind them it would disrupt their centre of gravity. Most likely / most dangerous courses of action (COA) The most likely scenario that could present itself in the near future is the continued expansion throughout the South China Sea along the nine-dash line, and the attempted takeover of smaller islands and creation of new islands in this region. The PRC’s COA available to them revolve around gaining a hegemony in the Southeast Asia region and taking back historic territory. This notion can be found through the expression of the ‘Chinese dream’ (The State Council, 2015) as well as current efforts in island and military base construction. In the short term, the most likely scenario would be that these locations are built for intimidation along the nine-dash line, but no aggressive action outright being taken immediately in the near future. In this scenario, it is also observed that the PRC could become the primary power in the area, diminishing the US influence in the region. This scenario is a likely one as seen by the lack of support of the Philippines by the US throughout this conflict, and overall little effort on behalf of the US in resolving this conflict (O’Rourke, 2019). A risk for Australia comes not from the economic power that presence in the region presents, but from the weakened US presence throughout Southeast Asia (Karotam, 2017). He elaborates that this risk is created through the diminishment of US presence in the region due to lack of involvement in this conflict, which in turn discredits them as an influencing power. Australia enjoys the military security that the US forces provide, and would be left with a severely depleted military capability, while the PRC would enjoy unrestricted reign over the South China Sea, leaving vulnerable countries in this area exposed to economic and military intimidation tactics. The most dangerous scenario that could come to fruition is a complete hostile takeover of the entirety of the South China Sea initiated by the PRC. This dangerous scenario would involve the entrapment of the Malacca Strait and cease of all trade through various SLOCs in this area. Repercussions of this could include the starvation of countries such as Taiwan, as well as the construction of fortified military bases in strategic points along the maritime region, disrupting two thirds of Australia’s exports (Department of Defence , 2016). This outcome is the most dangerous as it is a possibility and within the PRC’s capabilities, given their strategic placement of forces and proposed location of military bases. This scenario also places Australia at risk through allegiances, as the current Australian position on the conflict in this region is neutrality (Department of Defence , 2016): however, Australia holds deep trade partnerships with the PRC, but military ties and support with the US presence in Southeast Asia (Department of Defence , 2016). Comparison: While it is possible that these scenarios could occur, it just as easily could be a red herring. Other research (Karotam, 2017) finds that there is relatively little danger to Australia should the situation in the South China Sea escalate, as Australia is remaining politically neutral. This is due to the fact that both countries would suffer economically should the South China Sea be interrupted by conflict (Karotam, 2017), providing no reason for Australia to worry about negative intentions due to this mutually assured economic loss. However, this intelligence has some gaps. The main gaps that occur are as follows: Surrounding claimants’ future intentions regarding their claims. This gap is of utmost importance as we must know what other nations’ next moves are to be to properly prepare for them. For instance, Vietnam has been building defence systems along its shores to counteract aggressive military action from the South China Sea. Alternative methods to the PRC’s island claiming: are future intentions violent, based on island building, or do they involve negotiations. We are lacking in intelligence about how the PRC plans to claim the rest of the islands located in the region, for instance if the PRC are going to violently seize islands if they are not surrendered, negotiated, or they will simply will continue creating more islands in the area. If these efforts will expand beyond the South China Sea into neighbouring countries or seas. A major unknown is how far the PRC are willing to take their mission in the near future; will this conflict be limited to the South China Sea or will it expand beyond into neighbouring countries in the future. Our three priority intelligence requirements are as follows: Information about intentions and capabilities of the constructed island bases. While it is known that the PRC has completed deep water sections of at least three islands (Karotam, 2017), it remains an issue due to their unknown capabilities of causing warfare under the guise of defending their proclaimed territory. We are limited in our knowledge of the true offensive and defensive capabilities, and only know the minimum which is published to us. Capabilities of allies in the area to defend their claims militarily. We must maintain continued contact and intelligence sharing with powers in the region to ensure what their next moves are: both in offense and defence. This is also to ensure that the surrounding claimants are not excluded and vulnerable to economic and military intimidation. Continued tracking of the PRC maritime forces throughout the region. This is essential information that needs to continue being available to intelligence agencies. Conclusions and Recommendations This paper concludes that the next moves available to the PRC involve the claiming of islands in the region and intimidation of smaller countries nearby. The enhanced efforts to reclaim the South China Sea illustrate this, and if US presence in the area diminishes allowing for the free reign of the PRC conflict could occur. Recommendations include the increased information sharing between nations within the area, as well as allowing for the continued tracking of PRC forces and construction projects within the region. Finally, allies should utilize the Five Power Defence Arrangements (Department of Defence , 2016) to arrange intelligence sharing efforts to resolve this issue. -1541 words Bibliography Defence Intelligence Organisation, 2018. Defence economic trends in the Asia-Pacific, Canberra: Australian Government. Department of Defence , 2016. Defence White Paper, Canberra: Australian Government. Karotam, C., 2017. Are Australia’s interests jeopardised by a South China Sea dominated by China?, Canberra: Indo-Pacific Strategic Digest. O’Rourke, R., 2019. China’s actions in South and East China seas: Implications for U.S interests- background and issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service, 7(1), pp. 1-16. RSIS, 2012. Eurasia Review. Rethinking territorial disputes in South China Sea; transforming problem into opportunity- analysis, 10 September, pp. 1-2. Shi, X., 2015. UNCLOS and China’s claim in the South China Sea. Indo-Pacific strategic papers, 1(1), pp. 1-2. The State Council, 2015. 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